Opening Statement

There is a recurring cultural phenomenon on parts of the contemporary Left: if you are not the “correct” kind of socialist, you are declared not to be a socialist at all. I sometimes describe certain positions as liberal rather than socialist, but when I do so, I intend to make an ontological distinction — about what grounds social analysis — not to engage in social excommunication. There have been attempts to turn disagreement over identity questions into a loyalty test. The “socialism card” is revoked not because material analysis has been abandoned, but because someone refuses to affirm a particular theory of identity.

My position is not politically conservative. It is not right-wing. It is not religious. It is a materialist position grounded in historical analysis, scientific realism, and Constraint-First Material Ontology (CFMO).

I. Ontology: Categories Track Material Social Relations

I begin from a simple principle: social categories arise from material social relations. They are not arbitrary linguistic inventions, nor are they constituted purely by declaration alone. They describe historically formed structures.

Gender historically emerged from biological sex differences — reproductive asymmetry, statistically robust differences in strength and violence distribution, labour specialisation, and risk patterns. These factors produced sex-differentiated social roles, which were stabilised through institutions and reproduced socially. Over time, this social organisation of sex difference became what we call gender.

Gender did not originate as an internal metaphysical identity. It originated as the socialisation of biological sex difference under material conditions.

At the same time, reducing gender simply to “adult human female” or “adult human male” would also be reductive. Gender is not exhausted by biology alone. It is a historically sedimented social organisation of sex difference — institutional, normative, and behavioural — layered upon biological asymmetry.

CFMO’s constraint-based framework applies here: for something to be ontologically real, it must meet epistemic constraints and demonstrate discriminating consequences. Gender categories emerged from material constraints that produced recurring, statistically observable patterns in labour allocation, risk distribution, and reproductive organisation.

That genealogical fact matters unless and until a structural rupture can be demonstrated.

Ia. Labour Specialisation, Reproductive Asymmetry, and Evolutionary Lag

When I state that gender emerged from sex-differentiated labour specialisation, this is not a claim of biological destiny. It is a claim about constraint and recurrence.

For most of human history, humans lived in small-scale, resource-constrained communities. Under such conditions, reproductive asymmetry mattered profoundly: females gestate, gestation limits simultaneous reproductive capacity, and males are not constrained to a single reproductive event at a time.

From a demographic perspective, large-scale female loss threatens population continuity more directly than equivalent male loss. This is not a moral judgement; it is a reproductive constraint.

Under such asymmetry, risk allocation becomes materially relevant. High-mortality or mobility-intensive tasks would tend, statistically, to be allocated to the sex whose demographic loss posed relatively lower existential risk. This does not imply cultural uniformity; it implies that under similar demographic constraints, certain allocations are more likely to recur.

Over time, this interacted with correlated physiological and hormonal distributions. Males are, on average, larger and possess greater upper-body strength; males commit the overwhelming majority of severe violent crime across societies; testosterone correlates with increased risk-taking and aggression; females, on average, show greater longevity and immunological resilience.

These are statistical tendencies with overlap — not absolutes. But at population scale they are robust enough to generate recurring labour divergence.

Importantly, some sex-correlated behavioural distributions likely developed over long biological time horizons. Even if legal and social conventions change rapidly, we should not assume that biological distributions — whatever their exact causal mixture of nature and culture — will reconfigure at the same speed. Slow variables do not automatically synchronise with fast institutional reform.

The relevant question is not whether these distributions have evolutionary roots, but whether they remain predictive of institutional consequence today.

Ib. Evolutionary Continuity and Modern Society

Industrialisation, contraception, and bureaucratic states are extremely recent relative to evolutionary timescales. Removing environmental necessity does not automatically erase statistical distributions shaped under long constraint histories.

Reproductive asymmetry remains biologically operative, and sex-correlated behavioural and risk distributions remain statistically robust in high-impact domains.

The crucial question is whether these distributions have ceased to produce institutional consequences — whether they have become socially ineffectual. By “socially ineffectual,” I mean no longer predictive of asymmetric institutional risk, vulnerability, or demographic consequence at a level that justifies categorical anchoring.

They continue to influence institutional design in domains such as violence management and prison classification, competitive sport, military mobilisation, and reproductive and medical policy.

Technological mediation has altered the expression of these differences, but it has not eliminated their predictive relevance in high-impact domains. The claim here is not that such transformation is impossible in principle, but that it has not yet occurred to a degree sufficient to render sex statistically ineffectual as a predictor.

Mediation by technology is not erasure of constraint.

II. Descriptive Structure Before Rupture

The descriptive claim is that sex-correlated behavioural, physical, and reproductive distributions remain statistically robust and materially consequential. These distributions do not exist in isolation; they structure vulnerability patterns, violence distributions, reproductive roles, and institutional risk profiles.

At population scale, statistically recurrent distributions in strength, aggression, and reproductive constraint influence how risk and vulnerability are distributed within institutions. Higher variance in male violence distributions shapes patterns of victimisation and safeguarding design, while reproductive asymmetry shapes healthcare provision, demographic policy, and legal protections surrounding pregnancy and childcare. These distributions therefore do not merely describe biological differences; they shape the environments within which institutions must allocate protection, risk management, and resources.

Institutions operating under asymmetric harm must prioritise variables that reliably predict risk distributions. Sex remains a powerful predictor in domains where asymmetric harm exists. Male vs female continues to outperform masculinity/femininity in predicting severe violence distributions, strength asymmetry, and reproductive constraint.

In high-risk institutional domains, categories must be anchored in the variables that most reliably predict asymmetric outcomes. Where one variable consistently outperforms alternatives in predicting harm, vulnerability, or constraint, it is not merely descriptive but structurally constitutive for the purposes of classification.

So long as sex explains clusters of consequential distributions at population scale, it remains structurally constitutive of the category from which gender historically emerged.

IIa. Institutional Implications of Descriptive Structure

Institutions do not operate in conditions of symmetrical risk. In many domains, the cost of error is unevenly distributed, and that asymmetry forces classification systems to take predictive distributions seriously.

This becomes most visible in contexts such as prisons, competitive sport, military deployment, and safeguarding. In each of these domains, misclassification does not simply produce neutral error; it produces asymmetric harm. Placing individuals into categories that fail to track underlying risk distributions can expose others to elevated levels of violence, physical disadvantage, or vulnerability that the institution is specifically tasked with managing.

For that reason, classification within institutions is not merely a descriptive exercise. It is a risk-sensitive one. Institutions are not only concerned with whether a category is conceptually coherent, but whether it reliably tracks the distributions that matter for the harms they are responsible for preventing.

Where sex-correlated asymmetries in strength, violence, or reproductive vulnerability remain statistically robust at the population level, ignoring them does not eliminate those asymmetries. It instead produces a misalignment between institutional design and material reality. The institution continues to operate under the same constraints, but without a classification system that reflects them.

This is why the question of whether sex remains predictive is not abstract. It directly determines whether institutions can continue to manage asymmetric harm effectively. If the distributions remain, the cost of ignoring them is not theoretical; it is borne in the domains those institutions regulate.

For that reason, treating sex as categorically redundant in such contexts requires strong positive evidence, not simply a change in conceptual framing. The burden is not merely to show that alternative categories are meaningful at the level of identity or expression, but that they track institutional risk at least as well as, or better than, the categories they would replace.

It is therefore important to distinguish between two related but non-identical questions. One concerns whether a category adequately describes reality. The other concerns whether it supports effective institutional design under conditions of asymmetric harm. These questions often overlap, but they are not interchangeable. A category may be descriptively interesting yet institutionally inadequate, or descriptively coarse yet institutionally necessary.

The argument here is not that institutional categories must be simple reflections of biology. It is that where biological distributions continue to structure risk in high-impact domains, institutions cannot ignore those distributions without degrading their capacity to manage the harms they exist to contain.

IIb. Structural Continuity and Rupture

For a category to be re-grounded, it is not sufficient to propose an alternative basis. There must be a demonstrated structural transformation in the conditions that originally made the existing category predictive.

This is the difference between continuity and rupture. Continuity exists where the underlying distributions that gave rise to a category remain operative. Rupture exists where those distributions have changed to the point that the original category no longer tracks the relevant patterns.

If the claim is that identity — rather than reproductive class — now grounds gender categories in domains where sex-correlated asymmetries have historically structured behaviour, then that claim carries an evidential burden. It is not enough to assert that identity is meaningful or socially recognised. It must be shown that identity-based classification outperforms sex-based classification in predicting the outcomes that matter in those domains.

This is especially important in high-impact contexts, where predictive failure has institutional consequences. If masculinity and femininity, understood as identity or expression categories, were shown to track distributions of strength, aggression, risk-taking, or vulnerability more accurately than male and female, then re-grounding would not only be defensible but rational. The classification system would be updated to reflect the variable that better explains the outcomes.

However, that is not currently what the evidence shows. Across domains where physical capacity, violence patterns, and reproductive asymmetry remain relevant, male and female continue to function as stronger predictors at the population level than identity-based categories.

The argument, therefore, is not that re-grounding is impossible. It is that re-grounding requires demonstrated displacement of the original predictive axis. Without that displacement, replacing the category does not track a structural change; it introduces a mismatch between classification and the distributions those classifications are meant to organise.

This is not a metaphysical claim about what categories ultimately are. It is an empirical claim about what they currently do. If the distributions change, the categories should change with them. If they do not, maintaining the existing anchor is not conservatism for its own sake, but a response to the continued predictive relevance of the underlying structure.

III. Falsification Criteria

I would revise my position under at least one of these conditions:

1. Demonstrated genealogical overturning.
2. Identity shown to constitute a non-circular, materially real, predictive social kind.
3. Structural erosion of sex as a predictive institutional axis.

Absent such evidence, re-grounding is premature.

IV. Why Sex Remains Structurally Constitutive

I do not argue that biology rigidly fixes destiny, nor that reform is illegitimate.

I argue something narrower: reproductive asymmetry remains, sex-correlated distributions remain statistically robust, and those distributions continue to shape institutional design.

IV.a. On Reform, Suffrage, and Predictive Displacement

It is sometimes argued that a framework such as mine would have resisted past emancipatory reforms — women’s suffrage, the decriminalisation of homosexuality, or other institutional restructurings — on grounds of caution or predictive stability.

I believe the opposite is true.

Women’s suffrage was not a case of ignoring predictive reality. It was a case of correcting a category that failed to track predictive reality. Once women had comparable access to education and civic participation, there was no discriminating evidence that sex predicted voting competence, civic judgement, or eligibility for political agency. The original restriction persisted not because it tracked real constraints, but because it rested on assumptions that were never empirically validated.

The First World War accelerated this recognition. Women assumed roles previously reserved for men across industry, logistics, and administration, and demonstrated functional equivalence under institutional pressure. This was not symbolic inclusion but empirical validation. Under expanded participation, sex ceased to function as a reliable predictor of civic competence.

Similarly, the criminalisation of homosexuality lacked a discriminating harm model. The arguments for it were largely religious or speculative, and there was no robust evidence that consensual same-sex relations produced victimisation or asymmetric social risk sufficient to justify criminal classification. The category of “criminal” in this context was not empirically earned; it was imposed without a predictive basis.

In both cases, reform removed a constraint that was not structurally justified. Institutional change did not detach categories from reality; it brought them into closer alignment with observable reality by discarding predictive claims that failed under scrutiny.

The relevant distinction is therefore not between “biological” and “social” change. It is between cases where the original anchor loses predictive relevance and cases where it remains operative under empirical examination.

Under CFMO, predictive claims must pass both intelligibility (Gate A) and empirical discrimination (Gate B). Suffrage-era claims that women were inherently irrational may have appeared plausible within certain cultural assumptions, but they failed Gate B. As participation expanded, the empirical record contradicted them.

The mere articulation of a predictive claim does not grant it legitimacy. The distinction is between unsupported speculation and empirically validated, cross-contextually stable distributions.

My argument about sex categories concerns domains where sex-correlated distributions — reproductive asymmetry, strength distributions, and violence patterns — remain statistically robust and institutionally consequential. In such contexts, the predictive axis has not been displaced.

That is not status quo bias. It is evidential proportionality.

V. On Layering and the Parenting Analogy

A common response is that we can “layer” categories — that sex can remain biologically relevant in some domains while “woman” functions as an identity-based category in everyday language.

Layering is conceptually possible. My concern is not conceptual impossibility but structural sustainability.

For layering to be structurally stable, the layers must be separable in practice. That is, identity-based categorisation must be able to operate independently of sex-based classification without generating pressure for institutional convergence. Parenthood satisfies this condition. Gender does not, because it is historically constituted as sex plus sex-differentiated roles, not as an independent axis.

Social categories do not remain neatly partitioned. If the everyday category “woman” becomes identity-based, institutional pressure tends to follow. Language used in ordinary interaction propagates into law, administration, and governance. The stability of domain separation would therefore require strong legal and conceptual guardrails, which have not proven durable.

The category “woman” operates across multiple systems simultaneously — medical, demographic, sexual, relational, and institutional. Re-grounding it around identity would require demonstrating that identity-based anchoring produces greater systemic coherence across those domains, not merely recognition benefits in interpersonal contexts.

Parenthood illustrates how layering can function without erasing material anchors. Parenthood originates biologically through reproduction. Yet social recognition expands the category to include adoptive parents, step-parents, and other caregiving arrangements. These layered recognitions do not eliminate the biological dimension; they coexist with it.

The biological anchor remains structurally operative even when social recognition broadens. Parenthood illustrates this clearly. A child may be cared for by adoptive parents, step-parents, relatives, or close family friends, and those relationships may be socially recognised as parental in many contexts. Yet the biological relationship that generated the child remains structurally significant. In disputes over guardianship, inheritance, or legal responsibility, biological parenthood continues to carry default priority unless strong mitigating circumstances intervene. Social recognition can therefore expand the category of parenthood, but it does not eliminate the generative biological relation from which the category originally arose.

Crucially, reproduction is temporally bounded, while sex-based asymmetry is continuous. The biological act that establishes parenthood occurs at a specific point in time: conception and birth. Once a child exists, the reproductive event has already taken place. The parent–child relationship continues socially and legally, but the biological process that generated it is no longer ongoing. Sex-based asymmetry operates differently. The physiological differences associated with sex are not confined to a single reproductive event. They involve continuous biological processes — hormonal systems, reproductive capacity, physical dimorphism, and sex-linked risk distributions — that remain active across the lifespan. Because these processes are ongoing rather than episodic, their effects continue to shape social organisation in ways that cannot be reduced to a single historical event.

I therefore do not deny that everyday language and social recognition can be layered. In low-risk domains this may reduce suffering at minimal structural cost. The dispute concerns institutional domains where asymmetric harm is possible.

Where sex-correlated risk and vulnerability distributions remain statistically robust, institutions cannot treat sex as categorically redundant without strong evidence and durable safeguards. Where identity-based recognition overrides sex classification in asymmetric-harm domains without such safeguards, structural instability can emerge and dissent in such circumstances functions as an institutional safeguard rather than a moral failure.

If the category remains structurally anchored in sex-differentiated reproductive and risk distributions, then identity adoption alone cannot reconstitute the underlying class from which the category arose. Social recognition may broaden participation in gendered roles or presentation, but it does not alter the generative structure that produced the category itself.

A transwoman is a man who adopts and is sometimes socially recognised within roles, norms, and presentations historically associated with women. Reductionism in either direction is mistaken. “Woman” is not reducible to “adult human female.” But neither is it reducible to internal identity. It is a historically sedimented social category anchored in sex-differentiated material structure and layered with social norms, expectations, and institutions.

This represents sustained gender nonconformity within the male sex class rather than a reconstitution of the sex-anchored category itself. Recognition of such positioning does not alter the material generative conditions from which the category arose.

VI. Governance Under Uncertainty

Most social policy operates under incomplete evidence. Ontological grounding determines what categories track, while governance determines how those categories are applied under risk. These questions are analytically distinct but practically entangled.

In high-risk domains, classification errors carry asymmetric harm. The stronger and more irreversible the intervention, the stronger the evidential threshold required.

Irreversible decisions require especially strong evidence.

VIa. Irreversibility, Consent, and Evidential Thresholds

The governance question concerning medical intervention is independent of the ontological question of category anchoring, even though the two are often conflated in debate.

In general governance, materially irreversible interventions proposed for individuals with limited consent capacity require a higher evidential threshold. This is not specific to this domain; it is a general principle of risk-sensitive policy.

Adults possess bodily autonomy. Minors occupy a different developmental position. When consent capacity is incomplete and consequences may be fertility-affecting or otherwise life-altering, the burden of proof rises accordingly.

I do not claim medical expertise. My position is structural: permissibility depends on the strength of evidence and the robustness of safeguards. Where evidence is strong and protections are enforceable, permissibility may follow. Where long-term outcomes remain uncertain or safeguards are inconsistent, restriction is justified. If evidential thresholds for irreversible procedures in minors are not met, prohibition may follow from risk asymmetry rather than moral condemnation.

This stance should not be confused with hostility toward gender nonconformity. Divergence from normative gender expression is not, in itself, a form of harm. Ontological anchoring and civil tolerance are separate questions, and conflating them leads to category error in policy reasoning.

Under conditions of uncertainty, policy scales to risk. Irreversibility combined with limited consent capacity raises the evidential bar, not because of moral panic, but because of asymmetric consequence.

VIb. Institutional Thresholds and Gender Nonconformity

Divergence from normative gender expression is not, in itself, a form of criminal harm.

Adults who live or present in ways that depart from conventional gender expectations may generate social disagreement, cultural friction, or moral disapproval. However, such divergence does not by itself create asymmetric institutional risk. It does not constitute violence, coercion, or exploitation, nor does it demonstrate a structural threat that would justify intervention by the state or other governing institutions.

This claim applies in domains where divergence from normative gender expression is not materially connected to asymmetric harm. In domains where classification interacts directly with sex-correlated risk — such as competitive sport, custodial environments, or other contexts involving physical asymmetry or safeguarding — different considerations apply, because classification affects outcomes in ways that are not reducible to expression alone.

Outside such domains, however, the mere fact of gender nonconformity cannot justify persecution, exclusion from professions, or restrictions on participation in civic life. Absent demonstrable harm, there is no structural basis for preventing adults from working, organising, expressing their views, or participating in public institutions.

Within a CFMO framework, institutional restrictions require justification grounded in observable constraint. Coercive measures are warranted only where there is credible evidence of asymmetric harm, predictable vulnerability, or systemic risk that cannot be mitigated through less restrictive means. Without that grounding, intervention becomes difficult to justify either empirically or normatively.

Social disagreement may persist, but disagreement alone does not generate an institutional mandate for coercion. A society can contain moral disagreement without translating it into repression.

In this sense, the evidential threshold required to justify intervention has not been met.

VII. On Levels of Explanation

Political disagreements often arise from level confusion, the Right frequently interprets structural phenomena through individual psychology; the Left often interprets individual outcomes entirely through structural forces.

Consider obesity. At the level of the individual, behavioural change — diet and exercise — is causally decisive. At the level of society, structural variables — food access, education, urban design, economic incentives — explain distributional patterns.

To apply individual-level prescriptions to structural problems is analytically crude. But to deny individual agency in individual cases is equally mistaken. The same discipline applies to gender. Individual self-description matters at the interpersonal level. But institutional category design concerns population-level distributions and asymmetric risk. Confusing these levels produces distorted policy reasoning.

VIII. Socialism and the Limits of “Oppression” Framing

A central disagreement concerns how socialism itself is defined.

In contemporary discourse, socialism is often reframed primarily as an “anti-oppression” project. In its broadest sense, opposition to oppression can be shared across liberal and socialist traditions. However, socialism historically emerged as a structural analysis of class, production, and the organisation of labour, not as a generalised moral vocabulary of individual harm.

The problem is that the category “oppression” has become too elastic to function as a precise analytical tool. Not all experiences of constraint are socially oppressive in the structural sense. A serial killer may experience imprisonment as oppressive at the level of individual preference, but such imprisonment is not oppression in a structural or class-analytic sense. Without analytic discipline, “oppression” risks collapsing into any instance of subjective dissatisfaction or social friction, which removes its ability to discriminate between fundamentally different kinds of constraint.

Under CFMO, claims of oppression must demonstrate discriminating structural consequences beyond subjective experience to warrant ontological or institutional revision. Empathy may be warranted by lived experience, but institutional category revision requires demonstrable structural leverage. Without that constraint, the concept ceases to track anything beyond individual perception.

As the trans debate has evolved, much activist argument has increasingly centred lived experience and self-identification as justificatory grounds for linguistic and institutional revision. Even when framed as socially mediated, the ultimate authority often rests on internal identity claims. This re-grounds language in the individual rather than in material social relations, shifting the basis of explanation from structured reproduction to subjective declaration.

That move represents a shift from structural material analysis toward a liberal philosophy of language and recognition. It prioritises individual self-description as authoritative for category definition, rather than treating categories as historically generated structures that must be justified by their explanatory and predictive role within social reproduction.

My objection is not that lived experience is irrelevant. It is that socialism, as a materialist framework, cannot reduce category formation to individual identity without abandoning its grounding in historically structured social relations. Once that grounding is removed, the framework no longer explains how categories arise or why they persist; it simply defers to declaration.

When socialism is redefined primarily as anti-oppression in this individualised sense, it drifts toward liberal moral individualism. The difference is therefore ontological, not merely rhetorical.

Anti-oppression claims may motivate moral concern, but under CFMO they do not by themselves license ontological or institutional re-grounding without discriminating structural consequences.

IX. Why This Is Socialist

Socialism, in my understanding, begins from the analysis of material social relations.

More precisely, it treats the organisation of social reproduction — how labour, resources, and institutions are coordinated to sustain society over time — as the primary object of analysis. The central question is not primarily moral condemnation but structural explanation: how societies reproduce themselves materially and how power and surplus are distributed within that process.

Classical socialist theory emerged from this problem. It sought to explain how labour is organised, how production is coordinated, and how the conditions of life are reproduced across generations. Categories such as class, gender, and social role were therefore understood as arising from historically structured relations of labour, reproduction, and institutional organisation.

A materialist framework treats these categories as grounded in those structures. They are not free-floating labels, nor are they constituted purely through individual recognition. They persist because they track real constraints and recurring patterns within the reproduction of society.

Liberal political traditions, by contrast, tend to prioritise the moral standing of individuals and the recognition of personal identity. Questions of justice are framed in terms of rights, recognition, and the legitimacy of individual self-definition. The focus shifts from how social structures generate categories to how individuals should be acknowledged within them.

These approaches operate at different explanatory levels.

A socialist materialist approach asks:

• What structures organise labour and reproduction?
• What institutional patterns arise from those structures?
• How do those patterns shape class, gender, and social power?

A liberal recognition framework asks:

• How should individuals be recognised?
• How should language reflect personal identity?
• What forms of social acknowledgement are just?

These concerns are not necessarily incompatible, but they are analytically distinct and can come into tension when they propose different grounds for category formation.

My argument is that detaching gender categories from their material basis without demonstrating structural transformation in the relations that produced them replaces material analysis with identity-centred recognition theory. That is not simply a different emphasis; it is a shift in explanatory grounding.

That move shifts the framework away from the socialist tradition and toward a liberal one, because it replaces structural explanation with recognition-based justification.

My disagreement therefore concerns the grounding of analysis rather than the legitimacy of compassion or social tolerance. The issue is not whether individuals should be treated with dignity, but whether categories should be redefined without demonstrating changes in the material structures that generated them.

My own position can therefore be summarised as follows:

• Materialist in ontology
• Realist in epistemology
• Fallibilist in principle
• Precautionary in governance
• Liberal in coexistence

If material conditions demonstrably reorganise, categories should reorganise. If they have not demonstrably reorganised in risk-relevant institutional domains, caution is warranted.

Conclusion

Gender is not reducible to biology alone. But neither is it detachable from biology where sex-correlated distributions remain predictive of institutional risk.

Predictive relevance determines categorical anchoring. Where a variable continues to explain asymmetric outcomes at population scale, it remains structurally operative whether or not it is politically convenient.

Until it is demonstrated that sex has become socially ineffectual in structuring high-impact institutional domains, sex remains structurally relevant.

That is the argument.

This position should be understood as a fallibilist, materialist approach grounded in Constraint-First Material Ontology (CFMO). CFMO does not assume materialism as dogma. It treats ontological commitment as something that must be earned through constraint, prediction, and discriminating consequences, and revised when those conditions no longer hold.

I do not claim that disagreement with this position is impossible or immoral. Reasonable people may evaluate the evidence differently, or place weight on different domains of risk and relevance.

But disagreement does not remove the requirement to ground categories in something more than assertion.

Arguments grounded primarily in identity declaration rather than material social analysis therefore tend to align more closely with liberal theoretical traditions than with classical socialist ones. That is not a rhetorical point; it follows from the difference in what each framework takes to be explanatorily fundamental.

That does not automatically make such arguments wrong.

But it does mean that if someone believes identity declaration is the test of socialist legitimacy, they may want to check which theoretical tradition their own socialist card was issued from, as what is being asserted is no longer socialism in the materialist sense.

Thank you.